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Abstract
Background—Decontamination, cleaning, and reuse of filtering facepiece respirators (FFRs) 
has been proposed to mitigate an acute FFR shortage during a public health emergency. Our study 
evaluates the ability of commercially available wipe products to clean FFRs contaminated with 
either infectious or noninfectious aerosols.
Methods—Three models of surgical N95 FFRs were contaminated with aerosols of mucin or 
viable Staphylococcus aureus then cleaned with hypochlorite, benzalkonium chloride, or 
nonantimicrobial wipes. After cleaning, FFRs were separated into components (nose pad, fabrics, 
and perforated strip), and contaminants were extracted and quantified. Filtration performance was 
assessed for cleaned FFRs.
Results—Mucin removal was <1 log for all wipe products on all components. Inert wipes 
achieved ~1-log attenuation in viable S aureus on fabrics from all FFR models—removal was less 
effective from nose pads and perforated edges. Both antimicrobial wipes achieved 3–5-log 
attenuation on most components, with smaller reductions on nose pads and greater reductions on 
perforated strips. Particle penetration following cleaning yielded mean values <5%. The highest 
penetrations were observed in FFRs cleaned with benzalkonium chloride wipes.
Conclusions—FFRs can be disinfected using antimicrobial wipe products, but not effectively 
cleaned with the wipes evaluated in this study. This study provides informative data for the 
development of better FFRs and applicable cleaning products.
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A filtering facepiece respirator (FFR) is standard personal protective equipment to protect 
health care workers from respiratory threats such as pandemic influenza and tuberculosis.1,2 
An FFR in use will likely be contaminated through aerosol exposure, rendering it a fomite. 
During normal operations, an FFR should not significantly contribute to disease 
transmission because it is disposed of after each patient exposure. However, continual wear 
during a public health emergency increases the likelihood of an FFR acting as a fomite. 
Secondary bacterial infections are a major factor in mortality rates of influenza pandemics; 
thus, protecting individuals from viruses and bacteria (eg, during influenza pandemics) is 
important. Bacteria are typically more robust than viruses, so research focusing on bacteria 
should suggest ways to lower the chance that an FFR will act as a fomite.
For a pandemic lasting 42 days, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
estimate that US health care workers will require more than 90 million FFRs, implying a 
supply shortage.3 Such shortages could also occur during and following a bioweapon attack. 
Smallpox (Variola major) and pneumonic plague (Yersinia pestis) are highly contagious 
agents considered offensive bioweapons. FFR shortages resulting from a biowarfare attack 
should be confined to a local area and shorter in duration than during an influenza pandemic. 
An emergency measure proposed to alleviate acute FFR shortages on any scale is 
decontamination, cleaning, and reuse.3 Experimental data assessing feasibility of this option 
is needed to guide regulatory and legal decisions. Heimbuch et al4 and Lore et al5 
demonstrated 3 energetic decontamination methods—microwave-generated steam, low-
temperature moist heat, and ultraviolet germicidal irradiation—that inactivate H1N1 and 
H5N1 influenza viruses without significantly affecting FFR fit or function.6,7 Other 
chemical and energetic methods have also shown promise for decontamination of FFRs,8–10 
but we found no studies that addressed decontamination of bacterial agents on FFRs.
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires cleaning and sterilization of 
reprocessed medical devices and demonstration of their functional performance,11 but no 
reported data describe efficacy and compatibility of cleaning methods with FFRs. 
Sterilization and functional performance are relatively easy to assess; cleaning is harder to 
measure and no criteria are defined for “cleaned.” The Medical Device User Fee and 
Modernization Act (MDUFMA) regards the common definition of a clean device—no visual 
contamination present—insufficient and requires that an objective, measurable endpoint be 
specified.11 MDUFMA specifies no cleaning requirements for contaminants (eg, protein, 
microbe, and chemical), but requires that the reprocessor establish cleaning endpoints and 
the rationale for their selection. MDUFMA’s only reference to a quantifiable value—
sterilization following cleaning must achieve a sterility assurance level of 10−6—may not 
apply to FFRs (non-sterile devices), leaving the criteria for both cleaning and disinfection to 
be defined.
FDA labels National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)-approved 
surgical N95 respirators as single-use items, and no data have been reported from efforts to 
clean them. FFRs are porous, and therefore typically harder to clean than solid surfaces. 
Damage caused by cleaning is also a significant concern. Traditional methods to clean 
elastomeric respirators include washing with soap and treatment with disinfectants and 
disinfecting wipes.12,13 Literature provided by respirator manufacturers clearly states that 
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cleaning procedures should not be used on the filtering element and doing so disqualifies 
them as the FFR is the filtering element. New FFR cleaning methods are needed that are 
simple to perform, effectively remove the soil load, do not degrade the level of protection, 
require short regeneration times, and do not impart toxic residues. Long regeneration times 
eliminate methods that extensively wet the FFR. Soap washes and alcoholic solutions are 
also eliminated because they degrade FFR performance.9 We chose to evaluate 3 wipe-based 
products as a readily available, inexpensive, and presumably nonaggressive cleaning 
technique with short FFR regeneration times.
This study was an off-label use of both the FFRs and the wipes, and the results are only an 
exploration of the concept of reuse. Neither endorsement nor censure of any products tested 
nor of the concept of cleaning and reusing FFRs is implied. We examined physical removal 
of deposited contaminants; measurements of disinfection were included because 2 wipe 
products include antimicrobial agents. Because bacteria typically tolerate environmental 
challenges better than viruses, we expect behavior of the bacteria tested to represent or 




Two challenge aerosols were applied to FFRs in separate tests, per American Society for 
Testing and Materials method 2721-10.14 Staphylococcus aureus (ATCC 6538) was 
inoculated onto a trypticase soy agar plate and incubated overnight at 37°C. A swab of cells 
from the plate inoculated 50 mL trypticase soy broth in a 250-mL flask. The flask was 
incubated for ~18 hours at 37°C at 220 rpm. After incubation, the stock was removed from 
the incubator and diluted 1:2,000 in an artificial saliva buffer.14
Cleaning studies
Three NIOSH-approved N95 respirators cleared as medical devices by FDA were selected 
for this study (Table 1). All 3 models are commonly used in US hospitals. Wipe products 
selected for this study were 504/07065 Respirator Cleaning Wipes (3M Company, St Paul, 
MN),15 which contain benzalkonium chloride (BAC); Hype-Wipes (Current Technologies, 
Inc, Crawfordsville, IN),16 which contain 0.9% hypochlorite (OCL); and Pampers wipes 
(Proctor & Gamble, Cincinnati, OH),17 which contain no active antimicrobial ingredients 
(ie, inert). BAC and other quaternary ammonium disinfectants commonly appear in wipe 
products; the examples chosen are labeled for use on respirators. OCL was shown to 
decontaminate FFRs without significantly degrading performance, but created odor and 
oxidation problems.8,9 The OCL wipe was included to measure the ability of a limited 
application (wiping vs immersion) to remove contaminants and minimize incompatibilities 
with FFRs. Alcohol- and soap-based wipe products were avoided because they are known to 
decrease FFR performance.9
Each FFR is comprised of different materials for which cleaning efficiencies vary (Table 1). 
S aureus was applied to both interior and exterior FFR surfaces (in separate experiments) to 
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provide sufficient sensitivity for reliable analysis. Mucin was applied as a heavy loading (~1 
mg/cm2) only to exterior surfaces. FFR A was used as received. Only the flat front panel of 
FFR B and only 1 of the side panels (not containing the metal nose clip) of FFR C were 
used. No straps or metal nose clips were evaluated. For each independent test, 5 FFRs were 
loaded—3 cleaned as described below and 2 used to quantify the challenge. Two 
independent tests were performed for each condition, hence n = 6 for each FFR-wipe 
combination. After loading, FFRs were incubated at ~22°C for 30 minutes to clear aerosols 
from the test chamber. Each of the 3 test FFRs was wiped 3 times in turn with 4 faces of a 
fresh wipe product folded over twice. Total cleaning time per FFR was ~30 seconds; to 
ensure relatively constant wiping pressure and cleaning technique throughout the study, 1 
technician cleaned all FFRs.
After cleaning (or set time for uncleaned samples), FFRs were incubated 15 minutes at room 
temperature before quantification of contaminants. A 38-mm round—hole punch 
(McMaster-Carr, Robbinsville, NJ), was used to cut 4 coupons from the external (to the 
wearer) surfaces of FFRs A and B, and 3 from the (internal) surfaces that would be exposed 
to the wearer’s respiratory secretions; the nose cushion was removed and evaluated as a 
fourth sample. Three 38-mm coupons each were cut from internal and external fabrics of 
FFR C; a fourth sample was the perforated edge strip of the FFR. For mucin testing, each 
coupon was placed in a 50-mL centrifuge tube containing 10 mL sterile water and extracted 
for 10 minutes using a vortex mixer. A QuantiPro protein assay kit (Sigma, St Louis, MO) 
determined mucin recovery. For S aureus testing, the same extraction procedure was 
executed in 10 mL extraction buffer (1 M glycine, 0.1% Tween 80 in 1X phosphate-buffered 
saline). The extract was plated on trypticase soy agar using a Whitley Automatic Spiral 
Plater (Microbiology International, Waltham, MA). Plates were incubated at 37°C for ~18 
hours. After incubation, colony-forming units (CFUs) on the plates were enumerated using a 
Protocol Colony Counter (Microbiology International, Waltham, MA).
Filter performance after 3 cleaning cycles was evaluated for intact triplicate samples of each 
FFR model. For all thrice-cleaned FFR samples, a model 8130 automated filter tester (TSI 
Inc, Shoreview, MN) measured initial percent filter penetration by a polydisperse, solid 
aerosol of sodium chloride—count median diameter 0.075 ± 0.020 μm, geometric standard 
deviation <1.86 and mass median aerodynamic diameter ~300 nm—that meets particle size 
distribution criteria in 42 CFR 84 Subpart K, Section 84.18118 for NIOSH certification. All 
tests were conducted with a continuous airflow of 85 ± 4 L/minute. Particle penetration 
through N95 FFRs was determined using a transparent plastic box (20 cm × 20 cm × 10 cm) 
placed between the filter chucks (sample holding flange mechanism on the automated filter 
tester). At the center of the box’s removable top and bottom transparent plastic plates (20 cm 
× 20 cm) was a circular hole (25 cm2). The N95 FFR was placed on the bottom plate with 
the concave side facing the hole and sealed in place with melted beeswax.
Data analysis
Data were analyzed using conventional statistical tools in Prism 5 software (Graph Pad, La 
Jolla, CA). The S aureus and mucin cleaning efficiencies of similar components were 
compared using an unpaired, 2-tailed t-test at the 95% confidence interval. Filtration 
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performances of wipes were compared using a 1-way analysis of variance or ANOVA for 
each FFR model.
RESULTS
The mean loading concentration of mucin on FFR samples was ~1 mg/cm2. No mucin was 
detected in replicates using the OCL wipes, which we attribute to interference of 
hypochlorite with the protein assay, either directly or by reacting with the mucin. The 
removal efficiency (RE) of mucin by BAC and inert wipes ranged from 21.47%–76.41% 
(Table 2). Poorest REs were found using the BAC wipes on FFR C—respective REs for the 
external fabric and perforated strip were 21.47% and 25.41%. The inert wipe removed 
mucin more effectively than the BAC wipe, up to 76.41%, but removed only 38.87% from 
FFR C’s edge strip.
Reduction in viable S aureus varied among wipe—FFR component pairs (Table 3). The 
mean loading concentration of S aureus on FFR samples was 6.72 × 105 CFU/cm2. The inert 
wipes captured 81.56%–96.53% of S aureus from the base fabrics of all FFR models tested. 
REs were low for the exterior surface of perforated edge strips from FFR C (59.37%), and 
FFR B’s nose pad (69.28%). OCL wipes reduced viability below the detection limit (>5-log 
attenuation) for 7 of 10 samples among the 3 FFR models. Two remaining samples (interior 
fabrics of FFRs B and C) lost >4 logs in viability, the last sample (nose pad of FFR B) 
showing the smallest decrease (98.98%) of the sample set. BAC wipes produced 2 samples 
below the detection limit (interior surface of perforated edge strip from FFR C, interior 
fabric of FFR B); 5 other samples showed 3–5 log reductions in viability. Attenuation on 
FFR B’s nose pad again was the least (68.92%) of the sample set.
Mean particle penetration of each thrice-cleaned FFR model (Fig 1) was <5%, NIOSH’s 
N95 certification criterion. For all 3 FFR models tested, BAC wipes caused more 
penetration than the other wipes; for FFRs A and B, this difference was significant (P < .05). 
Of the models tested, FFR C showed the greatest penetration—1 replicate exceeded the 5% 
threshold (5.6%) after cleaning with a BAC wipe—and the differences were not significant.
DISCUSSION
FFR decontamination and reuse is a controversial strategy proposed to mitigate an acute 
FFR shortage during a medical crisis such as pandemic influenza. For single-use FFRs, this 
study explores options for cleaning, a step required by the FDA for reusable medical 
devices, a category that includes FFRs reused by medical personnel. We report the efficacy 
of commercially available, low-cost methods that might be used to clean FFRs during a 
critical supply shortage, and the effect of these methods on FFR performance. The study is 
exploratory and intended to prompt future investigation. Because both the FFRs and the 
wipe products are being examined outside their intended contexts of application, our results 
and conclusions are purely informational and are not to be taken as product evaluations or 
recommendations about reuse.
The inert wipes removed contaminants only physically, providing a baseline value of 
removal efficiency of contaminants from FFRs using a simple wiping technique—1-log 
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removal of mucin. The heavy loading (~1 mg/cm2) used to enhance sensitivity of analysis 
might have raised this value slightly. Protein from human breath condensate accumulates at 
~0.34 μg/minute breathing time.19 If one assumes a constant 8-hour wear time, the upper 
limit of protein contamination inside the FFR is 163 μg. Except in a direct contamination 
event (eg, sneezing and coughing), exterior FFR loading will be much less, but no precedent 
exists. In the context of cleaning, decontamination, and reuse of FFRs, removal of nonviable 
protein must be secondary to disinfection and should be balanced against decontamination 
and removal of infectious agents. This discussion should not be extended to applications 
reusing other devices because of factors not discussed herein; for example, allergens and 
endotoxins may cause adverse health reactions.
Inert wipes removed S aureus slightly more efficiently than mucin—1 log of S aureus from 
all FFR fabrics except the exterior of FFR C (81.56%)—but the results were statistically 
significant (all Ps < .0018). Nose pads and perforated strip of FFR C were cleaned less 
effectively, as expected due to their material properties and roughness. One-log removal left 
~1.5 × 103 CFU/cm2 on the FFR. In operational use, the interior (wearer’s side) of FFRs 
will likely experience loading concentrations used in this study, so the observed endpoint is 
a realistic estimate. In most real-world scenarios, external concentration will be lower; 
exterior loading of FFRs worn for 20 minutes in hospital rooms after discharge was 3–30 
CFU/cm2 (Heimbuch et al, unpublished data, 2013). Loading concentrations will increase 
with wear time, and FFRs worn under different operational conditions may experience 
different loading concentrations. The reuse scenario assumes that device users will reuse 
only their own devices and thus be exposed to only their own flora, and this study 
presupposed a decontamination step following the cleaning step. Based on FFR usage in a 
hospital setting (Heimbuch et al, unpublished data, 2013) residues on cleaned external 
surfaces would be <30 CFU/cm2. Because FFRs are not sterile devices and bacteria tend not 
to reaerosolize from fibers, this endpoint might be acceptable; however, user risk imposed 
by this level of contamination must be evaluated.
As a direct remedy, OCL and BAC wipes contain an antimicrobial agent that augments 
physical removal (cleaning) with a disinfection (kill) mechanism to reduce viable counts of 
S aureus. Hypochlorite in OCL wipes produced below detection limit values (>99.99% 
attenuation) for 7 of 10 surfaces (Table 3). OCL wipes effectively disinfected the perforated 
edge strip of FFR C and the nose pad of FFR A, on which inert wipes were only marginally 
effective. Hypochlorite solution was likely absorbed by FFR C’s edge strips and FFR A’s 
nose pad, providing greater exposure. The polyurethane nose pad20 of FFR B showed the 
least decontamination by OCL (98.98%); if physical cleaning caused ~60% of net removal, 
OCL contributed only 39% to reduction of S aureus counts on the nose pad. Amide groups 
of polyurethanes compete for hypochlorite, decreasing availability for surface 
decontamination and creating a chloramide that may act as a weaker disinfectant.
BAC wipes decontaminated less effectively than OCL wipes, giving below detection limit 
results for only 4 of 10 samples—edge strips and exterior fabric of FFR C, and the exterior 
fabric of FFR B. Deposition of BAC on the rough surfaces likely aided disinfection of the 
edge strip. FFR A’s nose pad, cleaned below the detection limit by OCL wipes, lost only 
98.6% of viability when cleaned by the BAC wipe, suggesting that its primary mechanism to 
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reduce viable S aureus on this surface is physical removal and that the urethane-derived 
chloramide is active, possibly as the actual disinfectant. Overall, BAC wipes disinfected 
FFR A less effectively than the other FFR models, which we presume indicates 
incompatibility of BAC with the device’s material properties. Material properties of the 
internal and external fabrics of FFRs B and C differ, as did their cleaning efficiencies. 
Physical removal of contaminants by inert wipes was fairly constant on these surfaces, 
supporting the idea of material incompatibility with BAC. Less mucin was removed by BAC 
wipes than by inert wipes, but both followed a similar trend. The BAC wipes’ cleaning 
efficiency of the external fabric from FFR C was notably poor (21.47%); roughly half the 
cleaning achieved on similar samples from the other 2 FFR models. FFR C’s external 
surface was also cleaned at lowest efficiency by the inert wipe—but by only ~15%. It 
appears that material properties of the external surface of FFR C are less receptive than the 
other 2 models to cleaning methods of this study. All 3 are surgical FFRs with fluid-resistant 
exterior surfaces, but properties of the fluid-resistant coatings may not be identical and can, 
in principle, be designed to influence cleanability.
Physical degradation of FFRs following cleaning appear to be negligible. No degradation or 
blemishing was observed of filtration media, nose pads, or nose clips. Measurements of 
particle penetration through FFRs following cleaning support a conclusion that physical 
damage caused by cleaning and abrasion was not problematic. The BAC wipe caused 1 FFR 
C to exceed 5% penetration and caused statistically greater penetration through FFRs A and 
B than did the other 2 wipes. The increase in penetration is attributed to the antimicrobial/
cleaning solution, which includes BAC and Tween. Tween is also present in the inert wipe; 
both products increased penetration through FFR C. BAC is a quaternary ammonium 
compound, and likely to interact with the charged surface of the electret medium and 
contribute to the decay in filtration performance observed for all 3 FFR models. Tween, a 
nonionic detergent, could also affect performance of electret media—some detergents have 
been shown to degrade the performance of FFRs.9 The similarity of particle penetration 
values for the 3 masks tested after cleaning with BAC and inert wipes (Fig 1) suggests 
dependence of the effect (presumably the availability) of the detergent on characteristics of 
the facing material.
CONCLUSIONS
Our study—a preliminary evaluation of FFR cleanability using available technologies—
focused on mucin and included S aureus, but we consider the data generally applicable to all 
microbial agents. An airborne respiratory pathogen (eg, influenza virus) would be coated in 
mucin and thus expected to behave similarly to the mucin protein. Feasibility of the concept 
of reuse has been reinforced here, but more studies are needed before such a practice can be 
approved or recommended.
Several experimental factors limit the overall applicability of the data. However, the data we 
present broaden the body of work on decontamination and reuse of FFRs and invite some 
measure of optimism. FFRs tested withstood significant physical handling and abrasion, and 
physical removal of both S aureus and mucin was demonstrated. The significance of 1-log 
reduction in contamination and availability of residual contaminants below FFR surfaces is 
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unclear. FFRs are not sterile devices, so levels of cleaning achieved should be put in context 
with loading concentrations observed during field use of FFRs.20 The FFRs were 
successfully disinfected by wipes that contain antimicrobial agents, against atypically highly 
concentrated challenges needed to permit measurement of 5-log reductions. A growing body 
of positive results encourages optimism that such a strategy can be practical for extending 
wear periods.
Both BAC and OCL displayed liabilities that limit their prospects for this application. BAC 
caused partial disinfection, but also degradation of filtration performance, which will exceed 
5% penetration after only 2 or 3 cleaning cycles. Immersion of FFRs in 10% household 
bleach affected FFR performance only minimally, but blemished the FFRs, oxidized metal 
parts, and imparted an odor.8,9 Selective topical application of more-dilute hypochlorite in a 
wipe greatly ameliorated oxidative damage. Wearers did not evaluate odor, but OCL wipes 
might serve as a 1-step remedy. A different detergent might perform more satisfactorily in 
practice, as might a more-repellent FFR surface.
These results will augment the ongoing process of developing a next generation of 
respiratory protection products.21 Multiuse FFRs are not currently marketed, but there is no 
regulatory impediment to developing such a device.22 A reusable FFR and its cleaning 
process would require NIOSH certification and FDA clearance. Cleaning and disinfection 
will be required according to MDUFMA, and the data in this study provide insight into 
design considerations for such a device. Materials used in nose pads of both 3M FFRs are 
incompatible with hypochlorite. This trend might not extend to other disinfectants and is 
another matter for further investigation. Surface roughness clearly lowered cleaning 
efficiency, as shown by ineffective cleaning of FFR C’s edge strip by inert wipes. However, 
this texture promoted concentration of antimicrobial agents, which locally enhanced 
disinfection. Successful development of a reusable FFR will require judicious selection of 
material properties and a design that allows for concurrent development of an effective 
cleaning and disinfection strategy. Selection of the antimicrobial agent must also be 
compatible with electret media and other respirator surfaces. We focused on the FFR 
material and nose pads; elastic straps are a subject for future studies.
The CDC, NIOSH, FDA, and Department of Defense have not recommended FFR 
decontamination and reuse because the practice is inconsistent with established regulations. 
NIOSH respirator certification regulations include no provisions for decontamination,18 so 
reusing FFRs in this manner will void their NIOSH approval.
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Particle penetration of filtering facepiece respirators (FFRs) following cleaning 3 times with 
wipe products. FFR A 1860S (3M Company, St Paul, MN), FFR B 3M 1870 (3M Company, 
St Paul, MN), and FFR C KC PFR (Kimberly-Clark Corporation, Irving, TX). BAC, 
benzalkonium chloride (3M 504/07065 Respirator Cleaning Wipe, 3M Company, St Paul, 
MN); OCL, 0.9% hypochlorite (Hype-Wipe, Current Technology Inc, Crawfordsville, IN); 
Inert, no active antimicrobial ingredients (Pampers Wipe, Proctor & Gamble, Cincinnati, 
OH).
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Table 2
Cleaning of filtering facemask respirators (FFRs) contaminated with mucin
Wipe product FFR* and component Mean reduction
BAC FFR A exterior 53.64% ± 8.62%
3M 504/07065 Respirator Cleaning Wipe† FFR B exterior 43.88% ± 6.30%
FFR C exterior Edge strip 25.41% ± 7.06%
Fabric 21.47% ± 7.87%
Inert FFR A exterior 76.41% ± 6.92%
Pampers wipe‡ FFR B exterior 66.96% ± 2.68%
FFR C exterior Edge strip 38.87% ± 10.0%
Fabric 61.94% ± 8.93%
BAC, benzalkonium chloride; Inert, no active antimicrobial ingredients.
*
FFR A, 3M 1860S (3M Company, St Paul, MN), FFR B, 3M 1870 (3M Company, St Paul, MN), and FFR C, KC PFR (Kimberly-Clark 
Corporation, Irving, TX).
†
3M Company, St Paul, MN.
‡
Proctor & Gamble, Cincinnati, OH.
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Table 3
Cleaning/disinfection of filtering facepiece respirators (FFR) contaminated with Staphylococcus aureus
Wipe product FFR* Component Mean reduction
Inert FFR A Exterior 95.80% ± 0.70%
Pampers wipe† Interior Nose pad 90.95% ± 1.51%
Fabric 90.01% ± 1.24%
FFR B Exterior 94.70% ± 1.72%
Interior Nose pad   69.28% ± 11.10%
Fabric 92.34% ± 4.13%
FFR C Exterior Edge strip 59.37% ± 8.61%
Fabric 81.56% ± 4.91%
Interior Edge Strip 85.24% ± 4.81%
Fabric 96.53% ± 1.40%
BAC FFR A Exterior 99.72% ± 0.32%
3M 504/07065 Respirator Cleaning Wipe‡ Interior Nose pad 98.60% ± 0.78%
FFR fabric 95.37% ± 4.25%
FFR B Exterior 99.96% ± 0.04%
Interior Nose pad   68.92% ± 13.10%
Fabric >99.999%
FFR C Exterior Edge strip 99.994% ± 0.002%
Fabric 99.998% ± 0.005%
Interior Edge strip >99.999%
Fabric 99.845% ± 0.060%
OCL FFR A Exterior >99.999%
Hype-Wipe§ Interior Nose pad >99.999%
Fabric >99.999%
FFR B Exterior >99.999%
Interior Nose pad 98.98% ± 0.17%
Fabric 99.997% ± 0.002%
FFR C Exterior Edge strip >99.999%
Fabric >99.999%
Interior Edge strip >99.999%
Fabric 99.998% ± 0.001%
Inert, no active antimicrobial ingredients; BAC, benzalkonium chloride; OCL, 0.9% hypochlorite.
*
FFR A, 3M 1860S (3M Company, St Paul, MN), FFR B, 3M 1870 (3M Company, St Paul, MN), and FFR C, KC PFR (Kimberly-Clark 
Corporation, Irving, TX).
†
Proctor & Gamble, Cincinnati, OH.
‡
3M Company, St Paul, MN.
§
Hype Wipe, Current Technologies, Inc, Crawfordsville, IN.
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